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Abstract: In order to work in licensed occupations, employees need permission from the state. In 
Germany, it remains unanswered why occupations become licensed and how licensing affects the 
wage structure. The article describes the institutional embeddedness of licensing in the German labor 
market. These institutions create barriers to entry and regulate prices of occupational tasks. By 
accounting for licensing and its accompanying institutions, the article shows licensing to generate a 
safety net effect rather than mere monopoly rents. As a consequence, wage inequality is reduced. 
Results from conditional and unconditional quantile regressions based on the BIBB-BAuA 
Employment Survey 2012 strongly support that view.  
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For a large number of occupations within the U.S., labor market persons need permission 
from the state to work within that occupation (Weeden and Grusky 2014; Weeden 2002). 
Occupational licensing has been criticized repeatedly: Scholars assume that it erects barriers 
to entry, dampens the competition within these markets artificially, and in its consequence, 
creates monopoly rents for those inside the market.  Apparently, American politics has been 
particularly susceptible to business interest in the past 30 years (Hacker and Pierson 2010). 
Political serfdom to the interest of those with high wages and neglect of those with middle 
and low wages has resulted in growing inequality. Recent scholarship has interpreted 
licensure of occupations along these lines (e.g. Carpenter et al. 2015; Pagliero 2011, 2010; 
Kleiner 2010; Weeden and Grusky 2014). While that may be an accurate description of the 
American case, the question arises of whether it can be transferred to countries with different 
institutional contexts.  
There are relatively few studies of occupational closure and its wage effects in Europe (for a 
rough description see Koumenta et al. 2014). Bol and Weeden (2014) evaluate the effect of 
occupational closure on inequality in the United Kingdom and Germany. They note that in 
Germany, institutions of social closure may protect occupations with wages at the lower end 
of the wage distribution. However, they do not assess the impact occupational closure has on 
the total German wage distribution. We provide an answer by making use of unconditional 
quantile regressions. Our theoretical perspective goes beyond past approaches by accounting 
for the economic regulation of licensed occupations. In our view, the focus on regulation of 
market entry alone causes a biased view of its rationale. Accounting for economic regulations 
such as fee structures, yields a more accurate picture. As a consequence, we conclude that the 





First, we hypothesize that the reported wage premium of licensed employees is primarily a 
safeguard to the lower end. Licensed professionals are significantly less likely to have low 
wages. Typically, their wages are capped additionally at the top through economic regulation 
of prices. Therefore, we estimate conditional quantile regressions on the basis of the 
BIBB/BAuA 2012 employment survey. Our aim is to compare the shape of wage distributions 
between licensed and non-licensed professionals. Further, we analyze whether licensed self-
employed are particularly privileged.  
Recent scholarship on the effects of occupational licenses on social inequality assumes wage 
premiums from licensed occupations to increase wage inequality (Bol and Weeden 2014; 
Weeden and Grusky 2014). We argue instead that the lower safeguard and the upward 
capping of wages in licensed occupations in combination with the location of their wages 
within the unconditional wage structure, results in a reduction of wage inequality. We assess 
whether self-employed persons in licensed occupations differ in this respect. We argue that 
unconditional quantile regressions are the appropriate measure for an assessment. 
We do not aim for an encompassing causal analysis of the effects of occupational licenses. 
What we aim for is a clarification of the foundations of occupational licensing in Germany. 
As a consequence, we need to update common assumptions about the kind of advantages 
arising for licensed professionals. Finally, we analyze the implications of these wage 
premiums for general wage inequality in Germany. 
In section 1, we review the literature on occupational licensing and its meaning for individual 
wages and general wage inequality. In section 2, we introduce the institutional foundations of 
occupational licensing in Germany and derive hypotheses concerning the kind of wage 
premium and its effect on wage inequality (section 3). Presentation of data and methods 
(section 4) and results follow (section 5). We conclude with a brief discussion of results.  
1. Occupational licensing: Review 
1.1 Protecting consumers or protecting suppliers? 
There is an ongoing discussion of the rationale for occupational licensing (Arias and Scafidi 
2009; Kleiner 2006b; Shapiro 1986). The discussants can be grouped into two positions: 
proponents of the monopoly hypothesis, and proponents of the social welfare hypothesis.  
Proponents of the monopoly hypothesis see licenses as the result of strong social closure. 
Along these lines, licensing an occupation is a success for the respective professional lobby. It 
increases and protects the market power of all persons active in the respective occupation. In 
that perspective, the state, as the one who enacts and implements the law, is lobbied into 
acting against its very own interest. The state should want to prevent the concentration of 
power in the hands of a few market actors. Whenever occupations have sufficient resources 
and opportunities, they attempt to influence state actors: “We propose the general hypothesis: 
every industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek to 
control entry” (Stigler 1971: 5). This viewpoint is prominently proposed by scholars who 
subscribe to ideas of liberal markets (Friedmann 1962; Potts 2009). They doubt that 
legislators intend to protect consumers and see the regulation of occupations as a mere act of 




Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). The arbitrariness of licensing is taken as evidence for that view 
(Carpenter et al. 2015). Certain occupations are regulated in some states but not in others and 
the burden of regulation also varies. These scholars expect occupational licensing to boost 
prices for occupational activities without quality improvement at a similar scale. In short, they 
argue, consumers and tax payers are the financiers of crony state policies. In that view, 
occupational licensure is a bottom-up process that is initiated by special interest groups. 
Licensing is the extreme along a continuum with certification, accreditation, and registration 
as is less severe forms. This process is described for the US in particular (Kleiner and Krueger 
2010) but some claim a general pattern that holds for all European countries (Koumenta et al. 
2014). 
Proponents of the social welfare hypothesis, on the other hand, hold that the political 
regulation of market access reduces potentially harmful information asymmetries. The 
example of an acute sick person looking for competent treatment illustrates that argument. 
How would she know whether a doctor is able to help her? Similarly, a building based on 
flawed static calculations implies risks and eventual costs for builders, users and neighbors 
alike. The argument brought forward by the other side thus is, that the state must guarantee 
the quality of certain goods. Under conditions of free market competition, market actors may 
threaten social welfare through bad decision making and poor quality of the products they 
provide. While according to free market logic, inferior competitors should disappear over 
time, proponents of the protection hypothesis predict markets of this kind to fail where access 
is unregulated. Market failure is defined as the disproportional payment of costs by one party 
caused by the information asymmetry with a second one. Such a market failure must be 
prevented with regulations of occupations like architects and doctors. Put differently, licenses 
resolve the asymmetry of information, the cost of which would be bared by the consumer. “It 
is often too costly for the consumers or regulators to observe service quality well enough to 
condition payments on quality. Licensing has a natural information advantage over quality-
contingent policies in that it can be enforced once-and-for-all at the time a professional is 
trained” (Shapiro 1986: 845). While proponents of the monopoly hypothesis expect a loss of 
welfare, proponents of the protection hypothesis highlight increases in welfare gained by 
licensing (von Weizsäcker 1980; Graddy 1991). In this view, licensing is a top-down process, 
initiated and authored by autonomous states. 
Hence, both hypotheses interpret the role of the state differently: From the first perspective, 
states serve the interest of special interest groups that aim at improving their market power. In 
the second perspective, states are autonomous actors on their own behalf. They regulate 
occupations whenever they consider the common good threatened in order to decrease the risk 
of substandard products for consumers. Few authors have argued for an intermediate 
perspective. Depending on the kind of occupation Zhou (1993) understands licensure as the 
outcome of either, special interest groups pressuring the state, or autonomous state action. 
1.2 Licensing and wage premiums  
Empirical contributions on economic consequences of licensing seem to rest on the monopoly 
hypothesis: Barriers to entry enforced by the state suppress competition and create 




wages compared to employees without license in an otherwise similar part of the labor 
market. Licensed employees thus earn a monopoly rent, which pushes their wages up. Most 
scholars claim that net average wage differentials between both types of employees can be 
seen as evidence for this claim. Next, we review studies of wage effects of licensing for the 
US, before we consider studies for the rest of the world.  
In her study of the US labor market, Weeden (2002) shows licenses to boost wages in addition 
to other occupational properties by 9%. In her view, licensing is a particularly effective form 
of social closure with a most severe suppression of potential competition. Morris Kleiner 
showed licensed employees in the US labor market to have a wage premium of about 10% 
(Kleiner 2000, 2006a; Kleiner and Krueger 2010). In one study, they find an even higher 
wage premium of licensing of 18% (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). Also, licensing by larger 
political jurisdictions (federal or state vs. local) has positive wage effects while entry 
requirements have no wage effect. According to studies by Kleiner and colleagues, 29% of all 
wage earners in the US were licensed in 2008. Gittleman, Klee, and Kleiner (2015) qualify 
Kleiner and Krueger‟s (2013, 2010) finding of a wage premium based on self-reported 
licensure in the SIPP. They find a considerably lower wage premium of 6.5% for certificates 
and licenses. This is also one of the few studies to consider distributional effects. Wages rise 
in all quartiles thanks to licenses or certifications, but the increase is most pronounced in the 
bottom quartile. 
A number of studies focus on wages in particular occupations. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find 
American dentists to earn more in federal states that require a license than in those that do not. 
At the same time, the quality of their service does not vary by state. Licensing neither affects 
the number of reclamations with insurers, nor the number of complaints with dentist 
chambers. These authors argue that this is what we should find if licensing would improve the 
quality. Timmons et al. (2014) explore how licensing of non-traditional health practices 
affects wages of physicians, physio therapists, and chiropractics. Physicians working in states 
with chiropractic colleges are shown to earn 4-5% less than their colleagues in other states. 
The authors further assess distributional effects of chiropractics‟ scope of practice on 
physician eearnings. A more liberal scope of practice is associated with higher earnings of 
physicians in the lowest decile and the upper quartile of the wage distribution. Physician 
wages at the top of the distribution are decreased by granting physio therapists direct access to 
patients.  
According to Pagliero‟s (2010) estimation, licensing reduces the number of American lawyers 
by 22%. The wage of lawyers would shrink by 46% if market access was unregulated. In 
another study, Pagliero (2011) shows starting salaries of US-lawyers to increase, when the 
difficulty of exams increases. Thus, the regulation of market access for lawyers has a strong 
influence on their wage. In a similar study of US certified public accountants‟ (CPA) 
earnings, Schaefer and Zimmer (2011) find a wage premium in states with stricter experience 
requirements for entrants. Continuing quality reviews of CPAs do not affect wages.  
Kane et al. (2008) evaluate the effect certification has on teacher effectiveness in New York 
City. According to their study, certification of teachers is a poor predictor of their 




Guryan (2008) come to similar conclusions based on nationally representative data on 
teachers and schools. Certification of teachers does not improve the quality of personnel but 
raises their salaries.  
Bryson and Kleiner (2010) analyze the situation of licensed occupations in the US and 
Britain. They find a similar prevalence of licensed occupations in both countries. They 
estimate the wage premium for licensed occupations to be 13% in Britain and 18% in the US. 
In 2001, licenses were introduced for employees in the British private security sector. Fernie 
(2001) finds no evidence of either wage increases or quality improvements after legal change. 
However, lacking representative quantitative data, he relies on qualitative studies that are 
mostly providing anecdotal evidence. Also, he admits that the employment of persons with a 
criminal record was an issue in the past and their number has been reduced through the 
regulation. 
Koumenta et al. (2014) provide an overview of licensing in the EU-27. Between 10-24% of 
the labor force is affected by occupational regulation. There is broad variation in the activities 
these countries regulate, with some states regulating more professionals and others regulating 
more crafts. Generally, occupational regulation is much lower in the EU compared to the US. 
The authors further provide case studies of eight selected professions in the UK. Positive 
wage effects are indicated for occupations that require more education and training. 
Accountants, dentists, pharmacists, and architects enjoy wage premiums of 9-19%, whereas 
wages of security guards, plumbers, social workers, and teachers remain unaffected. Input 
performance, measured by skill, is improved for all occupations but social workers and 
chartered accountants. Remarkably, the skill-boost is strongest for security workers although 
they have witnessed no wage premium. This finding qualifies Fernie‟s (2001) critical view of 
licensing‟s quality effects in the security sector. Pagliero and Timmons (2013) explore the 
regulation of lawyers in the EU-27 and identify variation of the institutionalization. Lawyers 
are licensed in most countries but only certified in a few. The authors argue that certification 
is superior to licensure because countries that apply it are not flooded with poor lawyers. 
Also, certification would be conducive towards creating a common market of EU lawyers that 
allows for competition of non-certified with certified lawyers. In a study comparing Germany 
and Britain, Bol and Weeden (2015) find licenses‟ wage premium to be roughly 10% in both 
countries.  
As this short review shows, there is a positive relation between wage levels and licensing of 
an occupation. However, some qualifications of these results are warranted. First, most 
studies do not answer why some occupations are licensed while others are not. That holds also 
for Bol and Weeden‟s (2014) study for Germany. The monopoly hypothesis is seen as 
sufficient proof of wage differentials. However, they neglect the economic regulation of 
occupational licensing that we present in section 2. Second, they do not provide an answer to 
the question of why states should tolerate the monopolies. If the main consequence of 
occupational licensing is the protection of occupational monopolies, states might just as well 
abandon the respective laws. Occupational licensing may result from lobbying and crony 




will argue, there are various reasons for the wage premium of licensed occupations and its 
protection that have been neglected by the literature.  
1.3 Licensing and wage inequality 
Recently, some scholars argued that occupational licensing contributes to an increase of wage 
inequality. The increased inequality in Western societies “occurred not only because of 
competition-increasing change at the bottom (e.g. declining union power, globalization) but 
also because of competition-reducing processes at the top. If we are correct in this diagnosis, 
the prescription is clear: We can take on poverty and inequality by repairing noncompetitive 
labor and capital markets and thereby reducing the inequality that such failed markets 
generate. […] The concept of rent is key to our argument. […] In contemporary labor 
markets, rent takes on many well-studied forms […] [like] the wage premiums that accrue to 
licensing and related types of occupational closure“ (Weeden and Grusky 2014: 474-475). 
The authors take it for granted that occupational licensing is to be found disproportionally at 
the upper end of the wage distribution. Monopoly rents boost high wages and thereby broaden 
the gap between the top and the middle, contributing to an increase in wage inequality.  
The implication is a general welfare loss that goes far beyond biased prices. Potts (2009) 
mentions five major detriments. Obviously, consumers pay the price for monopoly rents. The 
products offered by licensed professionals are artificially kept in low supply at the cost of 
consumers. Second, licensing tends to discriminate against consumers with low incomes who 
forego the consumption of certain products they would otherwise be able to buy. Third, 
occupational licensing tends to suppress innovations. That is because rules impair changes to 
established standards and because the incentive to outperform opponents is eliminated along 
with competition. Fourth, training of employees by their professional organizations causes 
further costs that are bared by consumers to the benefit of course providers, usually the bar 
associations. Fifth, technical innovations allow for stilling needs autonomously that required 
expert knowledge in the past and are thus licensed. Licensure would illegalize such semi-
professional practices and impair both development and use of technical innovations. The 
bottom line would be that consumers pay for the monopoly rent of licensed professionals and 
innovations are impaired due to the inflexibility induced by licensure. 
Similarly, Bol and Weeden‟s (2015: 1) results about occupational licensing in Germany and 
the UK have “important implications for understanding between-occupation wage inequality 
and cross-national differences in aggregate levels of wage inequality”. Their assumption is 
based on the observation that occupational closure is stronger in the UK than in Germany. 
Further, in Germany the coefficients of occupational closure are significant for high- and low-
skilled wage earners. They argue that “rents in the United Kingdom exacerbate wage 
inequality (by driving up top-end wages) more than in Germany, where rent-generating 
institutions are more likely to also protect low-wage or low-skill workers” (Bol and Weeden 
2015: 14). However, they cannot provide a formal test of that assumption and call for research 
„that focuses on institutionalized rents and their distribution across the occupational structure 
which may help us understand cross-national differences in aggregate levels of wage 




To sum up, the literature yields assumptions about the relation between occupational licensing 
and wage inequality. These assumptions‟ implications, however, have not been tested 
statistically. As we argue, there are noteworthy differences in the institutional make-up of 
German compared to American occupational licensing. Next, we provide an assessment of the 
German model of occupational licensing and develop hypotheses to test the influence of 
single occupational groups on the total wage distribution. 
2. The Institutional foundations of occupational licensing in Germany 
Occupational licensing has been portrayed as a bottom-up process initiated by special interest 
groups. That view is an inappropriate description of the German case. The regulation of the 
labor market through licensure is best described as a top-down process. The German 
Constitution guarantees every citizen to choose the occupation freely (GG, art. 12). 
Occupational licenses impose strong limitations on this constitutional right. Hence, they are 
acceptable within the German law system only if they serve a higher interest which outweighs 
the interest of citizens to choose their occupation freely. Next, we present the foundations of 
occupational regulation in Germany. We show that the regulation of market access is typically 
combined with other economic regulations which define a range in which prices for 
occupational tasks are allowed to vary. They include statutory fees, statutory contracts with 
insurances, and collective wage agreements with public servants. Only once we include these 
economic regulations in our analysis of occupational licensing, does the economic situation of 
licensed occupations in Germany become clear. Licenses must be understood as elements of 
coherent designs that are authored and implemented top-down with the intent to protect the 
common good. 
2.1 The “Pharmacy-Rule” and the Three-Stage-Theory of the German Constitutional 
Court  
In 1956, a certified pharmacist in Bavaria applied for a license to open a new pharmacy. The 
state-government denied his application with reference to art. 3, section 1 of the Bavarian 
Pharmacy Law. This law stated that a new pharmacy cannot be opened where it would 
compete with other pharmacies. The crowding out of competitors, however, is constitutive of 
a free market. The Pharmacy Law suspended the market principle in order to protect existing 
pharmacies from new and potentially better competitors. The government argued that 
competition between pharmacies might set incentives to sell substandard products. That 
would threaten the public good of health. 
The pharmacist filed a suit against the law in front of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) 
and achieved the annulation of the denial to his application and an amendment of the Bavarian 
Pharmacy Law. The FCC disagreed with the argument that a new pharmacy would threaten 
public health. This precedent-setting judgement, known as the „Apotheker-Decision‟, has been 
the reference point of any formal professional activity and occupational access (Schulte 
Sodingen 2000). As part of the decision the court presented the so called Three-Stage-Theory 
(FCC, 6/11 1958). Their jurisdiction determines the conditions that permit the legislator to 




The first stage covers rules of exercising occupational activities. That includes, for example, 
regulations of nurses‟ occupational activities. These rules are in line with occupational 
freedom under the condition that “they serve reasonable purposes of the common good and do 
not impose excessive or unacceptable burdens on the citizen” (own translation). The codes of 
professional conduct for lawyers, tax consultants, and physicians are complex regulations of 
exercising professional activities. They are relevant for the analysis of social closure because 
they restrict the amount of protected activities. The Administrative Court of Minden, for 
example, decided that plastic surgeons cannot perform the operations of a dentist, even if they 
are maxillofacial surgeons. A dual certification is required for these persons (decision from 
5/14 2007, Az K 3250/06). Hence, the first stage defines the amount of activities that are 
assigned to a profession. The right to exercise them is reserved to members of the profession. 
They represent no immediate obstacle to market access, since rules of the first stage may 




The second stage defines subjective entry requirements. That refers to regulations of access to 
professional activities tied to the person of the applicant. These formal barriers are permitted 
only “if they are a necessary precondition (under strict observation of proportionality) for the 
due fulfilment of the profession or for the protection of a fundamental public good (that is 
superior to the individual freedom)” (own translation). The second stage is the foundation of 
all licensing procedures and is rooted in the protection hypothesis. A common good is 
threatened if the activities for the provision of the good are substandard or improper. Licensed 
professions define preconditions for performing the profession for all individuals who want to 
do so. The first two paragraphs from the “Law on Geriatric Care”, for instance, read: 
§1 Persons may hold the professional title of geriatric nurse only once they obtain a 
legal permission. Persons with a permission according to sentence 1 who completed a 
voluntary training according to §4, section 7, are entitled to medical practices that have 
been part of their vocational training. 
§2 (1) The permission according to §1 is to be granted, if the applicant 
1. has completed the required training and passed the required exam, 
2. has forgone any behavior that would question the dependable practice of the 
occupation, 
3. has unimpaired sanitary conditions for the exercise of the occupation, 
4. has the necessary German language skills for the exercise of the occupation. 
This law exemplifies the function of occupational licensing. Usually, that kind of law protects 
the occupational title.
2
 The protection facilitates applicant selection by legitimacy. Protection 
of a title, however, is not equivalent with the protection of a professional activity. The title of 
                                                          
1
 Kleiner and Park (2010) illustrate this phenomenon drawing on varying privileges for dentists and dental 
hygienists. In some federal states of the US the latter may operate without surveillance by a dentist, leading to an 
wage premium of 10%. See Döhler (1997) for a comparison of varying rules of exercising professional activities 
across countries. 
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mechatronics engineer, for instance, is protected in Germany, while anyone can do the job of 
a mechatronics engineer. That is different for geriatric nurses. §1 of the law reserves the 
exercise of particular professional activities to the bearers of the respective professional title. 
A geriatric nurse must not exercise health-related activities that are beyond his competencies. 
Nursing homes have to hire suitable personnel with permission to deliver the respective 
services. 
According to §2, the permission to perform certain activities is conditional upon particular 
individual characteristics. Typically, applicants have to present evidence of a legally 
standardized training that is independent of a particular company. The basis of licensed 
professions is always independent of skill acquired in a company. The idea of standardized 
trainings is to make licensed wage earners compatible with any company or organization.  
However, the sample text from the law also shows that individual qualification is but one 
aspect of the issuance of a license through the state. Further elements include ethical, health-
related, and language-related characteristics. In this way, the process of licensing selects not 
only by professional expertise. In addition, persons are assessed with regards to their 
trustworthiness, personality, resilience, and communicative skills. 
The third stage of the Three-Stage-Theory relates to objective entry requirements. They 
regulate the amount of permitted professionals or companies. The third stage is “only 
permissive, where it is imperative for the containment of proven or highly-likely threats to an 
extraordinarily important public good”. Objective entry requirements can ban persons from 
market access, even if they fulfill all necessary requirements of a professional law.  
The monopoly of casinos in Germany is an example for a regulation of the third stage. Also, 
any quota for professionals is a restriction of the third stage. Quotas for physicians through 
the German Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (Kassenärztliche 
Vereinigung) are one of few examples (Hoppe 2007).  
Our discussion of entry requirements shows the active regulation of the number of wage 
earners within a closed labor market sector to be almost impossible. There are few exceptions 
and they are assessed by the FCC. There is no simple way for collective actors to regulate 
recruiting practices of companies in order to cause shortages of certain professionals. The law 
imposes strong limitations to such practice when it comes to licensing. If collective actors 
want to intervene, they have to resort to more subtle methods. 
2.2 Licensed professions and the common good 
In order for a profession to be licensed it has to be closely tied to a common good. Therefore, 
the definition of common goods is a matter of academic and legal debates. The common 
ground here includes public health, education, public security, and maintenance of the 
functions of government. Table 1 presents an overview of basic goods and the related 





Public health is a major concern of the welfare state. Hence, the majority of health-related 
professions in Germany are licensed. That includes physicians, pharmacists, podiatrists, non-
medical practitioners, nurses, physiotherapists, psychiatrists, psychologists, midwives, and 
veterinaries. No license is required for those who use the title of “Healer” (Heiler) or “Health 
Advisor” (Gesundheitsberater). However, they cannot legally treat their clients even if those 
were to ask for or benefit from it and even if the therapeutic treatment was free of charge. A 
self-declared “miracle healer” was sentenced to nine month on probation in 1977 by the 
German Constitutional Court (decision from 9/13 1977, Az 1 StR 389/77).  
The school system is under state supervision according to article 7 of the German 
Constitution. Hence, teachers need a ministerial license in order to practice their profession. 
The German federal states are autonomous in their educational policies. The regulation of 
teachers at private schools therefore varies in each of the states. The Federal Constitution 
rules: “Private schools as replacement for public schools require state permission and are 
subject to federal state law (Landesgesetze). Permission must be granted whenever private 
schools are not inferior to public schools with respect to their curricula, equipment, and the 
academic education of their teachers.” Thus, the second state exam, which is mandatory for 
teachers at public schools, is not mandatory for teachers at private schools according to 
national law. Equivalent qualifications are sufficient. The legal situation is similar for social 
(education) workers and preschool teachers (Erzieher). To sum up, these professions require 
licensing for employment in public service and they may require it even in the private sector 
although not necessarily. 
The maintenance of state functions is imperative for the rule of law. Jurisdiction, 
administration of justice, tax consultancy, and audit must be independent from state interest 
and lasting high quality must be assured. The restriction of professional freedom in this area is 
defended on these grounds. 
Public security is another major common good. Since force can be necessary in order to 
sustain that good and since the state has the monopoly to the use of force, there is a strong 
case for the regulation of market access in this realm. It is for the interest of public security 
that the state restricts market access for professions like police, chimney sweeps, pilots, air 
traffic controllers, pyro technicians, or architects.  
2.3 Economic regulation of licensed activities 
Licensed professions are always in direct relation to one of the mentioned common goods. 
The sustainable provision of these goods is not the state‟s only interest, though. Further 
objectives include coverage of the whole country and socially acceptable price determination. 
Provision fails where there are too few physicians to treat the clients or where the number of 
physicians is sufficient but their service is too costly for the majority of clients. Hence, the 
state is interested in regulating market access and price determination for goods and services 
in these labor market sectors.  
Usually, fee structures and scales of charges regulate prices for the respective professions. 
Paragraph 17 of the Federal Solicitor Law, for instance, defines the charges for solicitors. The 




jurisdiction that is underlined. That would be impossible under conditions of economic 
dependence on the principal. Prices for services of architects, construction engineers, chimney 
sweeps, tax consultants, and most health related professions are regulated for the same reason. 
Although some health related professions like physiotherapist and nurse are unregulated by 
fee structures, they are subject to §125 of the Social Law (Sozialgesetzbuch V). According to 
the paragraph, health insurances are bound to enter into nationwide (flächendeckende) 
contracts with providers of these services.  
Collective agreements regulate remunerations of employees in the educational system. 
Usually, only collective actors can engage in wage negotiations. Unions and professional 
representatives negotiate these wages with the state. Similar arrangements exist for the 
military, police, and air traffic control.  
Licensed professions do not necessarily imply strong regulations of price building and wage 
systems. Auditors, pyro technicians, and employees in inland navigation do not have 
schedules of fees and are typically not employed in the public sector. Prices for auditors are 
restricted to a certain extent, however, by the Civil Code. Other professions are not relevant 
for our analysis because of their small amount. 
The regulation of practices in licensed professions is rather strong. For the most part, free 
bargaining of prices for these activities is impossible. Practices that do not belong to the state-
defined activity of the profession are exempted from the standardization. It is rather common 
practice among auditors to offer consulting services. Since they do not count as auditing 
activities, remunerations can be bargained on a free basis here.  
3. Hypotheses 
Exponents of the monopoly hypothesis expect occupational licensing to sustain higher wages 
of licensed professionals compared to similarly qualified wage earners. As they argue, 
licensing reduces competition for existing jobs. Thus, it supports the market power of licensed 
wage earners and remunerations are higher than they would be under free market competition. 
This argument relies on two assumptions that are by no means trivial: licensure reduces the 
supply of labor relative to demand and prices are unregulated by the state. Both assumptions 
should be treated with caution at least for the German case.  
First, licensing of an occupation does not necessarily result in a reduction of labor force 
supply relative to demand. Collective actors cannot regulate the supply of labor force unless 
there are objective entry requirements controlled by them. That applies for a minor share of 
regulated professions. Usually, wage earners compete even in labor market sectors with 
strong regulation. The example of architects may illustrate this point. Although the market for 
architects is very small, the supply of architects exceeds demand by far. That holds in spite of 
strong entry requirements. Licenses are neither necessary nor sufficient for reducing the 
supply of professionals in a certain field. Still, this assumption underlies the work of many 
researchers (Weeden 2002, Kleiner and Krueger 2010, Stigler 1971). 
Second, the majority of licensed practices are subject to state regulation. It aims to prevent 




are illegal, supply cuts cannot result in price increases. That is the case for companies in the 
respective markets in particular.  
Employees are subject to that principle as well. Where wages are tied to their share in 
revenues, their wage for licensed activities is coupled to the standardization of prices. The 
wage of an employed speech therapist, for instance, can be only a part of his share in the 
company‟s revenue. Legal fee structures and lower limits for treatment times exist for most 
services of speech therapists. They set an upper limit to their wage.  The same holds for 
employees in all labor market segments with fee structures. 
These arguments cast doubt on the line of reasoning applied in much of the literature. The 
monopoly hypothesis is insufficient for understanding the German case. Still, some arguments 
can be made in favor of the position that licensed wage earners hold a privileged position in 
the labor market. 
First, these professions are particularly able to organize and bargain. They have more 
functional significance for the state since they provide common goods that the state wants to 
guarantee. Their bargaining power potentially results in more favorable collective agreements 
and fee structures. Since they are mandatory for licensed wage earners their wages can be 
expected to build on them.  
Second, the provision of public goods entails a public interest in avoiding corruption. 
Perceived underpayment is a major reason for corruption. Hence, safeguards against 
substandard wages represent major instruments of corruption avoidance. 
Third, these professions are usually less affected by decreasing demand for their services. 
Demand is assured by the character of the basic good they provide, a lack of which would 
impair state functions. Since they hold the monopoly on the provision, efforts of canalizing 
demand towards them is unnecessary. Additionally, the state has an interest in assuring a 
minimal supply of licensed professionals. Sometimes the anticipation of poor wages may 
result in decreasing interest in a particular profession. In the German debate, that is currently 
discussed for professions in the health sector (nurses, geriatric nurses) and in the educational 
system (teachers, preschool teachers). In these cases, actual supply cuts are not necessary to 
increase bargaining power. The anticipation of supply shortage alone can be enough for 
attaining economic privileges. The example of judges and public prosecutors illustrate the 
mechanism. On 5 May 2015, the FCC agreed with their claim that wages were insufficient to 
attract qualified personnel. Generally, the aim of such claims is to guarantee respective 
professions‟ appeal by insuring them against substandard wages. 
Fourth, licensed professionals are highly sought in closed labor market segments. Licensed 
employees can cause vacancies that can be filled only by them. Hence, the costs of fluctuation 
in markets with licensed professions are asymmetric in favor of the employees. A major 
benefit of licensing from the perspective of the individual is companies‟ lack of alternatives in 
case of labor shortage. Companies can draw on lateral entrants only under special 
arrangements that are extremely difficult to establish. The opportunity to switch between 
employers rather easily is an insurance against poor wages, since meager offers can be 




Finally, licensed professionals can realize high wages in markets that are unregulated, where 
they are in a good position thanks to their license. That is an argument for the privileged 
position of licensed self-employed. Licensed lawyers, for instance, are well qualified for the 
elaboration and assessment of contracts. However, these services are unregulated by the state 
as long as they are not part of lawsuits. When law firms offer them in combination, they may 
become more attractive. The bundling of regulated and unregulated services can be found in 
the health sector, too. The research institute of a German health insurer (AOK) estimates that 
one in four patients receives an offer for private health services from their doctor (Zok 2010). 
These services (e.g. acupuncture and homeopathic treatment) are unregulated by public 
insurances. Hence, the price negotiation is free. To mention another example, chimney 
sweeps are often energy consultants. The better licensed wage earners are positioned on free 
markets through their licensed profession, the higher the wages they can realize. An 
accountant will improve his wage by providing consultant services as opposed to 
concentrating on his main profession. This kind of service bundling should be expected from 
self-dependent wage earners and freelancers in particular. High wages can be expected for 
this group because there is no upper limit to additional unregulated services. However, they 
represent a small fraction of all licensed professionals. 
Hypothesis one follows from these arguments. 
H1: Occupational licensing in Germany reduces the likelihood of low wages but does not 
increase the likelihood of high wages. 
There is one caveat to this hypothesis. It follows from our brief discussion and from the fifth 
argument in particular: The likelihood of high wages increases for self-dependent licensed 
workers. Some of them benefit from quotas. The certification of doctor‟s offices by the 
Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians is a case in point. 
If we accept the first hypothesis, a second one follows, concerning the effect of occupational 
licensing on wage inequality. If occupational licensing reduces the likelihood of low wages in 
the first place and increases high wages to a lesser degree, wage inequality is reduced. In 
Germany, licensed workers are more prevalent in the middle of the wage distribution whereas 
Weeden and Grusky (2014) assume their concentration at the top of the distribution in the US. 
Hence, national differences in licensing institutions lead to different effects on wage 
inequality.  The regulation of fees and prices in licensed professions has to be accounted for.  
H2: Occupational licensing reduces wage inequality in Germany. 
This effect would be neutralized by wage premiums of licensed self-dependent workers, 
where top earners benefit as much as workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. 
However, we argue that the increased wage through licensing in the top groups does not level 
the overall minimizing effect occupational licensing has on wage inequality. 
4. Data and methods 




We test our hypotheses relying on the BIBB/BAuA Labor Force Survey 2012 (Hall et al. 
2014), a representative survey of 20,036 persons above the age of 15 and with a minimum of 
10 hours weekly working time. It yields detailed information on working conditions and 
worker qualifications. The scope of information provided and the number of cases at the level 
of occupations allow for stringent testing of our hypotheses. 
We test our hypotheses on two populations. First, all employees in the German labor market 
and, second, all wage earners in 2012. Hence, self-dependent workers and freelancers are 
included in the second sample. We excluded household members and persons who failed to 
indicate their professional activities. 
Our central dependent variable is logarithmic hourly wage (gross). We use imputed wage 
values as provided by BIBB. Week hours are as reported in the questionnaires but we reduced 
extreme values to 70 hours per week. Additional top- or bottom-coding does not alter 
interpretations. 
The licensure variable is coded as 1 for each profession with state regulation effective in 
2012. Coding is based on the „three-digits‟ of the job classification from 2010. 
The gender composition of an occupation is introduced as a control. An occupation is defined 
as dominated by men or women when 70% or more are of each gender respectively. There is 
evidence for wage-reducing effects of female domination (Busch 2013). Since many jobs in 
the educational and the health care system are licensed, and since these professions typically 
have high concentrations of women, wage premiums could be neutralized by this „gender 
effect‟.  
4.2  Methods 
Two methods are required to test our hypotheses. The first hypothesis concerns the relation of 
the wage distributions of licensed and unlicensed wage earners. The second hypothesis 
concerns the relation of the wage distribution of licensed workers to the total distribution. 
Since we want to analyze group-specific distributional differences, quantile regressions 
(Koenker and Bassett 1978) are an appropriate method for the first case. In the second case, 
we are interested in the effect of one group on the total distribution, which is modelled with 
unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo et al. 2009). We provide intuitive introductions to 
both procedures. Technical details and differences between both procedures can be found 
elsewhere (Borah and Basu 2014, Haupt and Nollmann 2014).  
The distribution of interest is split into shares of equal size for both regressions. In the case of 
1000 shares, each share counts as a quantile.
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  Each share has an upper boundary that lies on a 
value from the respective distribution. This value is called quantile value. Hence, the value of 
the 10
th
 quantile separates the lower 10 per cent of observations from the upper 90 per cent.  
4.2.1 The analysis of differences in wage distributions with conditional quantile 
regressions 
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Conditional quantile regressions estimate differences between group quantile-values. The 
licensing dummy for the 20
th
 quantile in a conditional quantile regression refers to the 
difference between two values: The one that separates the lower 20 per cent of all licensed, 
and the one that separates the lower 20 per cent of all non-licensed workers. A higher value 
for licensed implies a higher wage threshold for the lower 20 per cent of licensed workers. 
Licensed workers with low wages relative to their group would be in a better economic 
position compared to non-licensed with low wages. Hence, conditional quantile regressions 
allow for understanding in which parts of the wage distribution licensed workers are 
privileged compared to non-licensed ones.  
Figure 1 illustrates the variety of outcomes showing three hypothetical examples. The left 
hand panel shows quantile value differences by different quantiles. Each line is for a series of 
coefficients based on conditional quantile regressions for group-specific quantiles. The right 
hand panel displays the distributions that result from differences in quantile-values, 
comparing them to a reference group. The figure illustrates which group-specific 
distributional differences correspond to what kind of specific quantile value difference.  
[Figure 1] 
Case (a) relates to a mere level shift of a group compared to the reference group. All 
observations are shifted upwards by a fix amount from the range. The shape of the 
distribution remains unchanged. In case (b) quantile values at the bottom are roughly the same 
as in the reference group. Increasing quantile value differences result from a strongly stilted 
distribution compared to the reference group. In case (c) the largest premium is enjoyed by 
those in the middle, while top and bottom quantile value differences are negative or null. The 
corresponding distribution is compressed and shifted right relative to the reference group. 
If all workers benefit equally from their licensure, our finding should be similar to (a).  If only 
a specific group with top wages benefits, we should find a spread as in (b). And if licensure 
was a safeguard for those with low wages but no proportional advantage for those with top 
wages, we should find (c).  
4.2.2 The analysis of effects on a total distribution with unconditional quantile 
regressions 
Conditional quantile regressions serve for the comparison of two points on the distribution of 
two groups. However, no reliable inference can be drawn concerning the relation of the 
analyzed group to the overall distribution. That kind of relationship can only be analyzed with 
unconditional quantile regressions. These regressions estimate the effect of subgroups on the 
position of quantiles of the overall distribution. If occupational licensing were to increase top 
wages thereby increasing wage inequality, we should be able to identify an increased distance 
of top segments to the middle by the shape and location of the wage distribution of licensed 
workers.  
Figure 2 provides a graphic illustration of that idea. A coefficient of 0.5 in an unconditional 
quantile regression can be read as an increase of the analyzed quantile value by 0.5 for each 




share of the distribution that is comprised in the quantile towards the middle. The same 
coefficient above the median magnifies the distance to the middle, or, increases inequality. 
[Figure 2] 
The estimation of the effect on an unconditional quantile value is based on the idea that a 
distribution is a sum of relative frequencies of the analyzed variable. Relative frequencies at 
any point of the distribution are additive compositions of relative frequencies of sub-groups. 
The composition of sub-group specific relative frequencies can be analyzed for any part of the 
distribution. The effect of a single group on a point of the overall distribution depends on the 
distribution of relative frequencies of a group around this point. If 90 per cent of a group are 
below and ten per cent of it are above the 90
th
 quantile, it leaves the position of the 90
th
 
quantile unaffected. This claim can be illustrated by help of a thought experiment: If wage 
distributions of employees with temporary contract, indefinite contract, and civil servant 
status (Beamte) were identical, ten per cent of them would be above and 90 per cent below the 
90
th
 quantile. If all temporary workers were removed from the sample, the degree of 
inequality would remain unaffected, since the shape of the new distribution remained the 
same. If only one per cent of all temporary workers are above the 90
th
 quantile, their influence 
on the 90
th
 quantile is negative. By virtue of their higher likelihood to be below the 90
th
 
quantile, they drag the quantile value downwards. The 90
th
 quantile is the dividing line 
separating the lower 90 per cent from the upper ten per cent. If a group contributes more 
observation below the 90
th
 quantile compared to other groups, the quantile value needs 
downward adjustment in order to ensure the 90/10 ratio. If 20 per cent of all civil servants are 
above the 90 per cent quantile, the value is affected positively, because more observations at 
the upper margin shift the boundary upwards.  
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
About fifteen per cent of all workers in the sample need a license for their profession. Health 
professions and teachers make for 50 per cent of all licensed employees. Licensed workers are 
slightly more frequent among freelancers and self-employed (17%). Physicians, jurists, and 
therapists dominate within that group. Roughly eight per cent of workers are self-employed in 
both groups and freelancers are more rare in both groups. However, the likelihood of being 
freelancer is about twice as high among licensed workers (3.9%) compared to non-licensed. 
[Figure 3] 
Figure 4 shows relative frequencies of licensed workers for different quantiles of the wage 
distribution for persons with different labor statuses. The higher the wage, the higher is the 
share of licensed workers. It rises from five per cent at the bottom to 16.5 per cent in the top 
quantiles. Among freelancers and self-employed the share steadily rises from five to 30 per 
cent starting at the 40
th
 quantile. Only in the top quantiles can we notice the effect of the 





Overall, these results illustrate the economic premium of licensed workers. It is significantly 
lower, however, for employees. While the lower two thirds of the distribution are shifted to 
the right, top wages hardly differ from non-licensed employees.  Wage premiums are most 
remarkable for licensed self-employed, their share among self-employed and freelancers 
being disproportionately high. 
5.2 Differences in wage distributions 
Next, we discuss results of multivariate conditional quantile regressions. In order to compare 
wage distributions, we estimate 47 models starting from the 5
th
 quantile to the 97
th
 quantile in 
steps of two. After the estimation coefficients of occupational licensing are plotted along 
percentiles of the log. gross hourly wage distribution. We use a graphical way to present the 
data. A presentation in table format is not feasible owed to the high number of models.
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Models are estimated for the whole sample and for employees alone. 
Figure 5 shows estimated quantile value differences of licensed workers relative to non-
licensed ones. They are positive throughout and statistically significant at least at the 5% 
level. Licensed wage earners are economically better off throughout the wage distribution. 
This relative advance loses strength over the wage distribution and follows a linear pattern as 
it was expected for a wage compression effect (see figure 1). For each quantile the coefficient 
drops by 0.0003 logpoints (95% CI: -0.00035; -0.00026; R² = 79.9%). 
The addition of freelancers and self-employed increases quantile value differences only in the 
lower half of the distribution. The tendency for a reduction of the economic premium is more 
pronounced. For each quantile the coefficient drops by 0.0005 logpoints (95% CI: -0.00054; -
0.00046, R² = 93.3%). 
Overall, our results support the hypothesis that occupational licensing is a safety net towards 
the bottom (H1). There is no evidence of a level shift. In that case all coefficients would have 
to be on one level (cf. Figure 1 case (a)).  Also, licensed workers at the top of the wage 
distribution do not realize a significant wage premium. If that was the case, quantile value 
differences would increase and not shrink in the upper segments. However, the greater 
advantages are in the lower third of the distributions in both samples. If self-employed and 
freelancers are included, the shift of the lower third of the wage distribution of licensed 
workers becomes more apparent. As a bottom line, this supports the claim that the wage 
premium of licensed workers is more of a safety net than a monopoly rent boosting wages at 
the top. 
[Figure 5] 
5.3 The effect on wage inequality 
In this section we analyze whether licensed occupations increase or reduce wage inequality, 
or whether the effect is neutral. As in the previous section we estimate unconditional 
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multivariate quantile regressions between the 5
th
 and the 97
th
 quantile in steps of two, tracing 
the coefficients for occupational licensing.  
The results for occupational licensing and wage distribution can be seen in figure 6. The black 
line shows quantile value differences for wage earners alone. The grey line shows those of 
wage earners together with freelancers and self-employed. The effect of licensure on 
unconditional quantile values of wage earners is positive up to the 80
th
 quantile. After that, no 
effect can be observed. The effect on lower quantile values and for the lower third in 
particular is more pronounced. Occupational licensing elevates employees from the low-wage 
sector, thinning the lower parts of the wage distribution. If it was not for licensing, more 
workers would receive low wages. That would increase wage inequality. Starting from the 
median, quantile values are pushed upwards. If that was the only effect, the assumption of an 
inequality increasing effect of licensure would be supported. However, the slight spread 
above the median comes with a strong compression below the median. Hence, occupational 
licensing reduces the distance of lower parts to the middle significantly, whereas distance of 
the upper segments is increased only marginally or not at all.  
[Figure 6] 
Counterfactual quantile value relations illustrate this case mathematically. The value of the 
50
th
 quantile is 1.3 times as big as the value of the 10
th
 quantile (2.67/2.06≈1.3). Occupational 
licensing has a strong positive impact on lower quantile values. The value of the 10
th
 quantile 
is elevated by 0.141 points and the value of the 50
th
 quantile is elevated by 0.059 points. If we 
account for these effects in our calculation, the resulting relation is 1.24 ((2.67 + 0.059)/(2.06 
+ 0.133) ≈ 1.24), a reduction of the distance by 4.83 per cent. In this way we can calculate the 
impact on other distances. The distance of high wages (90
th
 quantile) to middle wages (50
th
 
quantile) is reduced through licensure by 2.18 per cent and the distance between high and low 
wages (10
th
 quantile) is reduced by 6 per cent. 
The only systematic effect of the addition of self-employed and freelancers to our sample 
concerns high quantile values. There is a positive and increasing effect starting from the 85
th
 
quantile. Self-employed licensed workers are disproportionally represented in the top wage 
segments. Although their wage premium is not excessive (see figure 5), their disproportionate 
representation in the upper segments (see figure 4) results in a strong influence on those 
segments of the distribution. That broadens the gap between top and middle wages. Overall, 
the retrenching effect of occupational licensing on wage inequality persists and is only 




 quantile ratio is now reduced by 4.82 








 ratio by 4.26 per cent.  
In spite of the wage premium of licensed professionals, especially of self-employed, that 
premium results in a net reduction of wage inequality. The reason is that the premium is not 
concentrated at the top but in the middle of the wage distribution. The likelihood of high 
wages for licensed vs. non-licensed workers is similar among employees. Hence, licensure 
leaves high quantile values unaffected. The likelihood to receive top wages is significantly 




size of that group, overall wage inequality remains unaffected. These findings clearly support 
H2.   
6. Discussion 
In this article we analyze the position of licensed workers in the German labor market. The 
legal foundation of occupational licensing in Germany is complex. Hence, a transfer of 
observations and theoretical assumptions that have been made for the US labor market may 
lead to flawed results in other settings. Accounting for the legal situation and the connection 
between licensed professions and common good provision is essential. We claim that the 
wage premium of licensed employees is best understood as a safety net. Results of conditional 
quantile regressions support that claim. Licensed self-employed and freelancers have strong 
wage premiums compared to unlicensed self-employed. Still, they do not change the overall 
picture. We show licensed occupations to reduce wage inequality by help of unconditional 
quantile regressions. Licensed workers are unlikely to realize low wages and they do not 
receive disproportionately high wages. As before, licensed self-employed and freelancers 
have a special role. Their high probability to receive top wages results in a spread at the top of 
the wage distribution. Due to the small size of that group, however, the effect on the total 
distribution is marginal. 
The FCC‟s interpretation of the Basic Law restricts licensure to professions that are neatly 
tied to common good provision. About thirteen per cent of German employees need a license. 
Prices for professional activities that provide or produce these activities are highly regulated 
and standardized. Even if the literature‟s interpretation of occupational licensing as the result 
of successful lobbying is accurate, this reading has to be qualified for the German case. 
Accounting for the relation to common good provision gives a more comprehensive picture of 
occupational licensing. 
Overall, results support claims to the necessity of a more differentiated analysis of licensure in 
the German labor market. Monopolies and economic rents from occupational licensing are 
only part of the picture. More research is needed to assess the combined effects of licensure 
and economic regulation in other countries. 
The results are highly relevant for labor market research. They demonstrate the institutional 
embeddedness of labor market relations that escape market logic. Many models in labor 
market research neglect the role of the state as an autonomous actor with specific interest. 
Instead, state service to particular interest groups is often presupposed. Our analyses show 
how state interest in the maintenance of public goods legitimizes barriers to market entry and 
economic regulation of prices. Both forms of regulation are consequential for the German 
labor market. Inclusion of these state regulations in our labor market models promises more 
accurate results. 
The results presented in this paper are also relevant for a better understanding of social 
inequality. First, they show that the wage premium of one group in the labor market can 
reduce total inequality. The wage premium of licensed workers is a case in point. The 
methodological approach presented here, allows for a qualification of socio-structural 




inter-group-inequality on total inequality. Second, results show that the normative evaluation 
of the relation between market entry barriers and social inequality has to be qualified, at least 
in the case of Germany. A small group of licensed workers, licensed self-employed, realize 
high wages, causing stronger wage inequality in the top segment. The discussion of the 
impact of occupational licensing has concentrated on this small group. However, self-
employed solicitors, physicians, and lawyers comprise a rather small fraction of all licensed 
workers. Once we broaden the perspective and include all licensed professions, we find a 
compressing effect on the wage distribution. That makes the analysis of occupational 
licensing an example for the study of the relation between labor market institutions and social 
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Figure 1: Quantile value differences of simulated distribution in relation to a reference distribution (left) and their 
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Figure 2: Heuristic for the interpretation of unconditional quantile regression results 
  
Increased Distance to the Middle
 Increase of Inequality
Reduced Distance to the Middle
 Decrease of Inequality
Reduced Distance to the Middle
 Decrease of Inequality
Increased Distance to the Middle




































































0 1 2 3 4 5














0 1 2 3 4 5














0 1 2 3 4 5
Log. gross hourly wage
Self-Employed






Figure 4: Share of licensed employees / self-employed over the unconditional distribution of log. hourly wages. The lines 
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Figure 5: Results of multivariate conditional quantile regressions for licensed occuptions separated by employment 
status. Filled symbols indicate significance at the 5% level in two sided tests. The lines refer to OLS estimates with the 
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Figure 6: Results of multivariate unconditional quantile regressions for licensed occuptions separated by employment 
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